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1. Introduction  
 
Through history, default on debt has incurred harsh punishment.  In biblical times 
and in ancient Greece, defaulted debtors were enslaved for a number of years or until the 
debt was fully discharged and during some periods in Rome, default met with maiming.1  
The United Kingdom had debtors’ prisons until their abolishment in the 1869 Debtors 
Act.   Now, the norm is limited liability, which limits creditor rights in pursuing debtors 
when they default on promised payments. Smith and Warner (1979) document that 
creditors impose restrictions on financial policies of firms through covenants, even prior 
to default, in order to control shareholder action that could reduce firm value.  However, 
bankruptcy laws which uniformly apply to all firms usually have precedence over private 
firm-specific contracts and therefore lead to inefficient outcomes for some firms. The 
importance attached to creditor rights in bankruptcy laws begs the question: What effect 
does the strength of creditor rights have on firms’ investments? While harsh penalty in 
default reduces fraud and opportunistic behavior by debtors, might it also inhibit 
entrepreneurial, bona-fide risky investments? These are the questions we address in this 
paper.  
Research on creditor rights has mainly focused on the link between creditor rights 
and financing policies. Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007a, 2007b), for example, 
document that creditor rights are associated with higher aggregate lending, in the cross-
section of countries as well as in time-series around creditor rights changes.2 This 
evidence is considered supportive of the view that strong creditor rights help expand the 
financing capacity of the firm by limiting the ability of owners to opportunistically 
expropriate firm’s value, and thereby reduce the costs that result from the conflict of 
interests between owners and providers of debt capital (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  
In contrast, this paper studies the link between creditor rights and investment 
policy. We propose that strong creditor rights induce firms to engage in risk-reducing 
investments such as diversifying acquisitions that are potentially inefficient and reduce 
value. The reason is as follows. Strong creditor rights in default lead to inefficient 
                                                 
1 In 450 BC: The Twelve Tablets, Section III, Debt. The penalty ranged from imprisonment to extracting part of the body. 
2 Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2006) find that the improvement in enforcement of creditor rights in Central and East European 
countries through the creation of a collateral registry boosted lending. Vig (2007) shows that firms’ propensity to borrow was, 
however, reduced in India when creditor rights were strengthened. 
3 
 
liquidations that extinguish the continuation option of firm’s enterprise and hurt 
stockholders. And, when creditor rights mandate the dismissal of management they 
impose a private, or in other words, a personal cost on managers. To avoid these costs, 
shareholders and managers lower the likelihood of distress by diversifying or reducing 
operating risk. If such risk reduction results in value loss or bypassing profitable 
investments, then strong creditor rights result in dead-weight costs to firms and the 
economy at large.  
Our empirical analysis studies this hypothesized effect of creditor rights on the 
risk-reducing activities of firms. We exploit as an explanatory variable the variation of 
creditor rights across countries in their bankruptcy codes. Djankov et al. (2007a) show 
evidence that creditor rights have changed little between late 1970s and early 1990s, the 
beginning of our dataset. Therefore, we can consider creditor rights in a country to be a 
function of its legal origin and exogenous to the nature of the country’s overall corporate 
investments. Even the few creditor right changes within a country, whose effects we also 
analyze, are often motivated by exogenous forces (which we later discuss). 
Our empirical evidence employs three different measures of corporate risk-taking 
whose variation across countries we seek to explain.  We find the following:  
 
(1) Stronger creditor rights induce firms to prefer risk-reducing investments.  Using 
acquisitions of other firms as a publicly-observed corporate investment, we find 
that stronger creditor rights in a country are associated with a greater propensity 
to do diversifying acquisitions.  Furthermore, changes in a country’s creditor 
rights affect the merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity in a similar direction: 
the extent of diversification through M&A increases following the strengthening 
of creditor rights and declines if they are weakened.  Corporate diversification 
has been shown in some studies to destroy value, which suggests a negative 
consequence of strong creditor rights. (We discuss below the evidence on the 
value effect of diversifying mergers.) 
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(2) In countries with stronger creditor rights, firms appear to choose a mode of 
operation that reduces operating or cash flow risk, measured by the standard 
deviation of firms’ ROA.  
 
We obtain these results both in tests at the level of individual acquisitions or firms 
and at an aggregate country level.  Overall, these results are strongest (statistically as well 
as economically) for the creditor rights corresponding to (i) whether there is no automatic 
stay on the debtor’s assets in bankruptcy  and (ii) whether management is dismissed in 
bankruptcy.  For example, dismissal in bankruptcy reduces the likelihood of a merger 
being in the same industry by 6.6% (based on Table 3) where the standard deviation of 
this likelihood across countries is 10.3%, and it lowers the operating risk measured at the 
country level by around 3% (based on Table 7), where the cross-country standard 
deviation of operating risk is 2%.  Thus, the effect of creditor rights on corporate 
investment policy seems large. We also examine the effect of creditor rights at the 
industry level because countries differ in the composition of their industries, and 
industries may differ in the propensity to diversify or reduce risk. Employing the 
empirical methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), we obtain that the findings in (1) 
and (2) above still hold. In addition, we find that 
 
(3) In countries with strong creditor rights, target firms whose assets have high 
recovery value in default3 (or distress) are more likely to be acquired by firms 
whose assets have low recovery value. This is because a high recovery value of 
assets enables firms in distress to defer default by liquidating some of these assets 
and using the proceeds to service debt.  Thus, by acquiring a high-recovery 
target, a low-recovery firm reduces the likelihood of default in case of distress. 
 
Our analysis focuses on M&As because they provide a unique opportunity to 
observe a major corporate investment and its effect on corporate risk – whether the 
acquisition is diversifying (across industries) or focusing (within-industry).  In M&As, 
                                                 
3 Assets with high recovery value have lower costs of liquidation. These assets lose less of their value in distresses sales and, 
following the definition of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), have lower specificity in that they are fungible across industries and hence 
fetch prices that are close to their value in best use. Our exact measure of high-recovery industries is based on the realized recovery 
rates on debt of defaulted firms in different industries documented by Acharya, Bharath  and Srinivasan (2007). 
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we can also identify whether the assets in which the company invests are of high or low 
recovery value.  Also important for our setting, corporate investment in the form of M&A 
decisions is not tainted by cross-country differences in reporting practices that affect 
other measures of investment such as capital expenditures and R&D.  However, 
recognizing that firms employ other means to reduce risk which are difficult to observe, 
we also analyze the overall operating risk of firms under different regimes of creditor 
rights and confirm that our results from analyzing M&A’s hold also for this direct proxy 
of a firm’s risk. 
 
Related literature: The effect of corporate diversification on company value is a subject 
debate, with studies presenting conflicting evidence.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
and Comment and Jarrell (1995) show that diversifying mergers result in reduction in 
value. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that diversified conglomerates have significant value 
discount compared to the conglomerate’s imputed value if its division were valued 
according to their standalone counterparts in the industry.  However, Campa and Kedia 
(2002) and Villalonga (2002) find that the diversification discount disappears after 
addressing endogeneity econometrically.  This is because business segments acquired by 
conglomerates are inferior to their industry’s standalone counterparts.  These results are 
recently overturned by Ammann, Hoechle and Schmid (2008), who replicate these 
methods in an out-of-sample analysis for 1998-2005 and find that after accounting for 
endogeneity, the conglomerate discount remains economically and statistically 
significant.  Recently, Laeven and Levine (2007) and Schmid and Walter (2008) find 
significant conglomerate discount in financial firms after accounting for endogeneity.  
Conglomerates enable internal capital markets, which facilitate capital allocation 
and overcome the problem of asymmetric information and moral hazard attendant with 
external finance.  However, conglomerates may also reduce value because of what 
Schafstein and Stein (2002) call the “dark side” in the allocation of resources through 
their internal capital markets.  Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) find that 
investments in some conglomerate segments are related to cash flows in other 
conglomerate segments rather than to the investment opportunities of that segment, 
suggesting inefficient investment.  This result is consistent with Berger and Ofek’s 
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(1995) finding that conglomerates overinvest in segments whose industry has poor 
investment opportunity, and with Lamont and Polk’s (2002) findings that diversity in 
investment opportunity is positively related to conglomerate discount. Indeed, Scharfstein 
(1998) points out the existence of “socialism” in conglomerates’ internal capital markets, 
by which strong divisions subsidize investment in weaker ones, and divisions in high- 
(low-) Q manufacturing industries tend to invest less (more, respectively) than their 
stand-alone industry peers, indicating inefficient resource allocation.  Rajan, Servaes and 
Zingales (2000) find that inefficient divisions receive inappropriately high flow of 
resources.  Comment and Jarrell (1995, p. 68) question the link between conglomerates 
and internal capital markets, showing that “diversified firms do not rely any less on 
external capital market transactions” than do undiversified firms.4  
Internal capital markets may be valuable in emerging markets where external 
capital markets malfunction.  Khanna and Palepu (2000) point out that in a country with 
poorly functioning institutions, such as India, group affiliation may be beneficial. They 
conclude that in India, the most diversified business groups add value, measured by 
Tobin’s q, which contrasts the results obtained in the U.S.5  Different results are obtained 
by Lins and Servaes (2002), who analyze over 1000 firms from seven emerging markets 
in 1995. They find that diversification leads to discount, particularly in firms with high 
ownership concentration, firms with great disparity between cash flow rights and control 
rights (indicating agency problems), and  firms that are part of industrial groups. Lins and 
Servaes reject the theory on the benefits of internal capital markets, even in an emerging 
markets setting. A possible reconciliation of these conflicting results may be found in a 
more recent study of the value effect of affiliation with business groups (chaebols) in 
Korea, over the period 1984-1996.  Lee, Peng and Lee (2008) find that the effect of 
diversification on value changed over time. In the early period, group affiliation or the 
extent of diversification in the business group was value increasing, whereas in the more 
recent period, the value premium turned into a significant value discount. Lee at al. 
                                                 
4 However, there is some ongoing debate here too. Analyzing plant-level data, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) suggest that the 
conglomerate discount results from lower productivity of some peripheral segments, whereas its main segments are as efficient as 
their stand-alone industry counterparts. This, in their view, implies that the conglomerate discount is endogenous and not a result of 
agency problems. 
5 Analyzing 1309 Indian firms in 1993 which are about equally divided between diversified and focused firms, Khanna and Palepu 
(2000, p. 887): “Firms affiliated with a large majority of diversified Indian business groups have lower Tobin’s q measures than 
unaffiliated focused firms, but those firms affiliated with the most highly diversified Indian business groups have higher Tobin’s q 
measures than all the other firms in the economy.” 
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explain this change by improvements in the institutional setting: liberalization of capital 
markets and transition in the product and labor markets have made internal capital 
markets less important for capital raising. Notably, the recent period in the study of Lee 
et al., where diversification discount exists, corresponds to the beginning of our study’s 
sample period. 
Our results are consistent with those proposed in other studies on the effects of 
creditor rights.  Manso (2005) proposes that penalizing failing entrepreneurs inhibits 
innovation. In our analysis, strong creditor rights enable such penalties.  Consistent with 
this hypothesis, Acharya and Subramanian (2007) show that strong creditor rights bear 
negatively on corporate innovation and R&D activity, measured by the intensity of patent 
creation and citation by firms. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith and Sufi (2008) 
find that restrictive debt covenants and enforcement of covenant violations, which 
provide firm-specific creditor rights, inhibit capital investment.6  Adler (1992) suggests 
that while strong creditor rights induce the manager to increase the firm’s risk as the firm 
approaches default, their ex-ante effect is to reduce risk and avoid insolvency.  Adler, 
Capcun and Weiss (2007) further propose that the recent strengthening of creditor rights 
in the U.S. has induced firms to delay default which could destroy value.  
Our finding that diversification is driven by managerial agency problems is 
consistent with several empirical papers. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggested early in the 
literature that diversification is associated with managerial motivation to reduce risk and 
thus may not necessarily reflect value-maximizing decisions.  Tufano (1996) studies 
hedging by 50 publicly traded gold-mining firms in the U.S. and Canada and finds that 
firms with greater managerial stock ownership hedge more, suggesting that managerial 
risk-aversion drives hedging. Tufano (1998) suggests an alternative channel whereby 
hedging benefits management by reducing the discipline imposed by accessing external 
capital markets for finance. In a recent paper, Gormley and Matsa (2008) study firms that 
face exogenous increases in legal liability from worker exposures to occupational 
carcinogens and find that these firms undertake acquisitions targeted at diversifying the 
firms’ assets by acquiring healthier businesses outside of the primary line of business, 
especially when the affected firms have high risk of bankruptcy and weak external 
                                                 
6 Schwartz (2001) proposes that allowing parties flexibility in contracting for preferred bankruptcy procedures alleviates 
underinvestment arising due to strong creditor rights.  
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governance. This evidence also suggests a managerial agency effect at play in inducing 
diversifying acquisitions. 
 
 The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model that motivates 
our studying the causal effect of creditor rights on corporate investment choice. Section 3 
discusses the data and empirical design and presents the results. Section 4 offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical motivation 
 
We present a stylized model to analyze the effect of creditor rights on firm’s risk-
taking incentives. The model examines the effect of reorganization outcomes for 
management and shareholders of a distressed firm on the ex-ante investments of the firm. 
Figure 1 presents the time-line of the model.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. 
 
Consider a firm at date 0 that is run by an owner/entrepreneur (the “manager” of 
the firm).  The firm has made some past investment (say I units) and has some existing 
debt in place of face value F which is maturing at date 1.7  The manager can choose at 
date 0 the risk of the firm’s future cash flows to be realized from this investment at date 
1. We adopt the technology for choice of risk from a part of the banking literature, 
starting with the models of Blum (1999, 2002) and Allen and Gale (2000).  The risk 
choices at date 0 are indexed by y ≥ 0, which represents the firm’s cash flow in case the 
investment succeeds at date 1. Success is likely with probability p(y), where 0 < p(y) < 1, 
p’(y) < 0, and p’’(y) < 0.  With remaining likelihood, [1 – p(y)], the investment fails at 
date 1 and produces cash flow of zero. Thus, y is also an index for the risk of default of 
the firm:  Greater y reduces the likelihood of success p(y) (in a concave fashion).  Agents 
are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate of interest is zero. 
                                                 
7 We do not model the choice of leverage.  Our empirical tests will, however, control for potential endogeneity of leverage to creditor 
rights.  Acharya, Sundaram and John (2004) provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of how leverage responds to creditor rights in 
a cross-country setting. 
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At date 0, the owner/manager makes the choice of risk, maximizing equity value 
net of creditor payments, and anticipating the outcomes from resolution of distress (if 
any) at date 1.   
In case of default at date 1, the continuation prospects of the firm depend upon 
managerial quality. Managerial ability at date 1 may be either high or low with equal 
probabilities.  We assume that neither the manager nor the firm’s board of directors 
which hires her know this ability unless it is investigated at date 1, as we explain below.  
Also, for simplicity, we assume that managerial ability does not affect the date-0 
investment.  In other words, managers are assumed to be randomly endowed at date 1 to 
be high or low type with equal likelihood. 
In case of default at date 1, a firm operating under a high-ability manager yields 
cash flow of H while a low-ability manager yields zero cash flow.  If the firm is 
liquidated to outsiders and ceases to exist, it will fetch cash flow of L.  We assume that 
2L < F < H.  The following are the possible outcomes upon default, which occurs if the 
realization from the investment is zero: 
 
(1) With probability r (r > 0), the firm is liquidated to outsiders by creditors, which 
yields L.  This may occur due to failure amongst the different creditors of the firm 
to agree on a reorganization outcome (we discuss below possible explanations for 
such a failure). 
(2) With probability q (q > 0), creditors investigate the type of management and find 
it out. Then, if the manager’s ability is found to be low, the manager is dismissed 
and the firm is liquidated, realizing cash flow of L. If the manager’s ability is 
found to be high, the firm continues with the current manager and realizes cash 
flow H. The likelihood of each such event occurring is 0.5. 
(3) With the remaining probability of (1 – q – r) (assumed positive), creditors are 
unable to learn managerial type. If the firm continues with the current manager, 
the cash flows are H or 0 with probability of 0.5. If H is sufficiently high 
compared to proceeds from liquidation (we assumed that 0.5H > L), creditors are 
better off if the firm continues compared to liquidation even if the manager type 
in unknown. Therefore, creditors agree to a reorganization proceeding with the 
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current manager. Notably, if the manager turns out to be of bad type, assets that 
are used for one more period have depreciated and become worthless. Thus, 
continuing for another period makes the firm forego the ability to liquidate the 
assets to outsiders for L.   
 
Assumption (2) is consistent with empirical evidence.  For example, Eckbo and 
Thornburn (2003) find that in Sweden, where creditor rights include the automatic firing 
of the manager in default, the rehiring probability of dismissed managers increases in 
managerial quality.8 
If manager is found to be of low quality and is dismissed (probability of 0.5q) or 
the firm fails to reorganize and is liquidated (probability of r), managers are assumed to 
suffer a private or personal cost of m > 0 due to loss of reputation or private benefits of 
control.9  This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence.  Gilson (1989), Baird 
and Rasmussen (2006) and Ozelge (2007) find that upon distress, there is a significantly 
higher probability of top-management dismissal, especially due to direct intervention by 
lending banks, compared to firms not in distress. Gilson also documents that managers 
dismissed in distress suffer a significant private cost in the form of future employment 
opportunities.10 Eckbo and Thornburn (2003) also find that in Sweden, managers of 
bankrupt companies suffer a median (abnormal) income loss of 47%.  If the firm 
continues without knowing the manager’s quality (with probability 0.5(1 – q – r)) and the 
manager turns out to be of low quality, we assume for simplicity that the manager has 
received private benefits of control for one additional period which offset the private cost 
suffered when the type is revealed at the end.  
The assumed inefficiency in reorganization, which leads to liquidation rather than 
continuation, reflects creditors’ failure to reach an agreement amongst themselves 
regarding bankruptcy proceedings.  For example, suppose that firm’s debt of face value F 
consists of secured debt of amount F1 and unsecured debt of amount (F - F1), where F1 < 
                                                 
8 In particular, Eckbo and Thornburn (2003) find that managerial quality (based on trustee assessment that the bankruptcy was not due 
to managerial incompetence or economic crime) is increasing in the firm industry-adjusted pre-bankruptcy operating performance and 
the recovery rate of its debt, and decreasing in the trustee’s evaluation of the manager and in the delay from insolvency to filing. 
9 We assume that business failure which might occur if a low-quality manager continues does not incur the cost m that is incurred as a 
result of forced dismissal by creditors. 
10 Gilson (1989) documents the likelihood of dismissal of managers in leveraged firms following adverse stock performance is almost 
thrice higher than in firms that are not distressed. Importantly, the laid-off managers are not employed in publicly listed companies for 
another three years, implying that managers of distressed firms suffer significant private cost. 
11 
 
L. Suppose also that secured creditors have claim to all assets of the firm and there is no 
automatic stay on secured creditors’ rights. Then, because secured creditors are fully 
covered under liquidation but face some default risk in case firm is continued (and 
managerial type turns out to be low), they have incentives to liquidate the firm. In 
contrast, unsecured creditors value the continuation outcome. Thus, there is a conflict of 
interest amongst creditors whether to expend any time and effort in learning about 
managerial type at all: secured creditors may just prefer to seize and liquidate the assets. 
Such reorganization failure is also more likely if reorganization petition requires majority 
consent of creditors and secured (or more generally, senior) creditors can block 
continuation in favor of liquidation. Another possibility (outside of our model) is that 
firm’s continuation requires additional financing, but due to debt overhang problem, this 
can be raised only if the firm can arrange supra-priority financing, such as the debtor-in-
possession financing in the United States. However, if creditor rights do not allow 
secured creditors’ claims to be subordinated in this way, then no continuation may be 
feasible, resulting in liquidation of the firm. 
We assume that the probabilities q and r reflect the law on creditor rights in 
which the firm operates.  These parameters map directly into their empirical counterparts 
of creditor right scores (as measured, for example, in LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998)).  The empirical counterpart for q is the score MANAGES, which 
equals 1 if management is dismissed in bankruptcy.  The counterpart for r is the set of 
other creditor right scores, namely AUTOSTAY, SECURED and REORG.  These 
correspond to there being no automatic stay on assets of the debtor in bankruptcy (so that 
creditors can seize assets right away if they wish to), secured creditors being paid first, 
and reorganization requiring creditors’ consent, which as explained above could lead to 
failure to reorganize due to disagreement amongst creditors.11 In our model, while 
creditor right to dismiss management leads to more information about managerial type 
and therefore better continuation and liquidation decisions, the other three creditor rights 
result in inefficient liquidations of the firm. However, all these creditor rights impose a 
private cost on management and induce in them aversion to risk (even though they are 
endowed with a risk-neutral preference in our model). We derive this result next. 
                                                 
11 Schwartz (2001, p. 128) points out that “without a bankruptcy procedure, creditors acting individually may force liquidations, 
thereby preventing the reorganization of viable but temporarily insolvent firms.” 
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 In the presence of leverage and risk of default, the owner/manager chooses the 
risk y to maximize the expected value of equity net of the private costs from distress, 
given as: 
p(y) [y – F] + [1 – p(y)] [  – (r + 0.5 q) m + (0.5 q + 0.5(1 – q  – r)) (H – F) ]. (1) 
This expression reflects the fact that management suffers a private cost m when the firm 
is liquidated – either due to failure to reorganize or due to revelation of his type being 
low - and has residual value in distress in other cases provided there is excess cash flow 
after creditors are paid off. This latter scenario has a probability of (0.5 q + 0.5(1 – q –r)) 
because there is excess cash flow after paying creditors only if managerial type is 
discovered by creditors to be high and firm is continued (probability of 0.5 q) or if 
managerial type is not discovered but it turns out ex post to be high. 
The optimal choice of risk for the levered firm y* is thus given by the first-order 
condition: 
p(y) + p’(y) [ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1 – r) (H – F) ] = 0 ,               (2) 
and, the second-order derivative is 
 2 p’(y) + p’’(y) [ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1  – r) (H – F)] .                (3) 
Note that p’(y) < 0 at the optimal risk choice y*, so we must have  
[ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1  – r) (H – F)]  > 0 ,           (4) 
so that the second-order derivative above is negative and the first-order condition indeed 
gives the optimum that maximizes the objective of manager.12 
 The three terms after y inside [.] in the condition (4) for y* illustrate the additional 
effects on risk-taking for a levered firm.  The first term, –F, reflects the fact that a levered 
firm has incentives to shift risk given equity’s “option” like payoff at date 1.  This effect 
is not however sensitive to creditor right parameters q and r. The second term (r + 0.5 
q)m reflects the risk-aversion induced in managerial objective by the fact that 
management suffers a private cost upon being dismissed.13  This effect is increasing in r, 
the failure of creditors to agree on reorganization, and also increasing in q, the likelihood 
that management is dismissed in bankruptcy, both assumed to be a property of the 
creditor rights of the country.  The third term – 0.5 (1 – r) (H – F) also corresponds to a 
                                                 
12 To see this, note that because p(y) > 0 and p’(y) < 0, the expression p(y) + p’(y) [y – x] is greater than zero for all y ≤ x. Hence, the 
solution to the equation p(y) + p’(y) [y – x] = 0 must satisfy y > x. 
13 The manager is risk neutral, but the personal cost that he endures because of dismissal in bankruptcy makes his reward function 
concave, making him averse to risk. 
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risk-shifting incentive.  This is the “option” effect from date 2 when the firm is 
continued.  Crucially, the magnitude of this effect diminishes in r, the likelihood that 
creditors fail to allow the firm to efficiently reorganize in bankruptcy. 
 To summarize, creditor rights that enable dismissal of management in bankruptcy 
and that are less likely to lead to a reorganization outcome discourage ex-ante risk-taking 
by firm’s management.    
We prove these two results formally as follows. Denoting the first-order condition 
for management’s optimization as f (y*(q,r), q, r) = 0, the second-order condition implies 
δf / δy < 0.  In turn, taking the derivative of f with respect to q or r, and applying the 
implicit-function theorem gives 
 
(i) sign (dy* / dq) = sign (δf / δq), which is negative because          (5) 
δf / δq = p’(y) m < 0,  
 
and, similarly, 
 
(ii) sign (dy* / dr) = sign (δf / δr), which is also negative because         (6) 
δf / δr = p’(y) [ m + 0.5 (H  – F)] < 0. 
 
Thus, the risk that a levered firm undertakes declines in the likelihood that 
management is dismissed in bankruptcy and that reorganizations promoting continuations 
of the firm do not materialize. These two implications constitute the foundation of our 
empirical investigation. 
 
3. Hypotheses, Data and Empirical Design  
 
Motivated by the model’s results, we study the effects of creditor rights on 
corporate propensity to take risk by testing three hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis I: The propensity to do diversifying acquisitions increases in the strength of 
the country’s creditor rights. 
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Hypothesis II: The firm’s operating risk, measured as the volatility of its cash-flow-to-
assets ratio, is decreasing in the strength of the country’s creditor rights. 
 
Hypothesis III:  In economies with strong creditor rights, target firms in high-recovery 
industries are more likely to be acquired by firms in low-recovery industry. 
 
We test these hypotheses by examining data on corporate behavior and on creditor 
rights from 38 countries.  The first two hypotheses test two aspects of risk taking by 
firms.  In studying mergers, we directly observe the action that firms take in order to 
affect their risk.  We test the relationship between creditor rights and diversifying 
mergers both in the cross-section of countries and in time-series, around changes in 
creditor rights of a country.  Because most companies can reduce their risk by applying 
other means that may be difficult to observe directly, we also conduct a second test of 
whether companies’ operating risk is decreasing in creditor rights.  Both of these tests are 
conducted in two ways.  In one, the unit of observation is a transaction or a firm, and in 
the other, we look at country averages.   
The third hypothesis examines the effect of creditor rights on the choice of assets 
by acquirers. A firm with high-recovery assets can liquidate some of them in time of 
distress and use the proceeds to defer default.  High-recovery assets lose less of their 
value in distressed sale and fetch prices that are closer to their value in best use (using the 
notion of “asset specificity” from Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).  Bidder firms with low-
recovery assets are therefore more vulnerable to default risk because they are less able to 
defer default by asset liquidation.  Indeed, Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) find that a 
high recovery value of assets (imputed from book value items) has particularly high value 
for firms in financial distress. Also, Eckbo and Thornburn’s (2003) study suggests that it 
is in managerial interest to increase the recovery rate of debt in default (which is related 
to assets’ characteristics), because the probability of rehiring managers who are 
automatically dismissed in bankruptcy is an increasing function of the recovery rate of 
the firm’s debt.  
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The data in our analysis include country variables – legal and economic – and 
data on individual companies and acquisition transactions. Table 1 describes how the 
variables are constructed and the data sources. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
3.1. Creditor Rights 
The data on creditor rights comes from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), whose sample records creditor rights provisions in the cross-country 
sample as of 1994.  The variable CRIGHTS is the sum of four provisions: AUTOSTAY, 
the absence of automatic stay on the assets of the debtor in reorganization; REORG, the 
requirement of creditors’ consent or minimum dividend for a debtor to file for 
reorganization; SECURED, ranking secured creditors first in the disposition of assets of 
the bankrupt firm upon filing for reorganization; and MANAGES, the removal of 
management from managing the activities of the firm upon filing for reorganization.  
Each of these provisions takes a value of 1, if it is present in the country’s bankruptcy 
code or zero if it is absent.  Consequently, the range of values for CRIGHTS is 0 through 
4.  In our 38-country sample (see Table 2), the mean of CRIGHTS is 2.08 with standard 
deviation of 1.28. We also use the creditor rights data of Djankov et al. (2007a), which 
details the components of creditor rights, to examine the impact of changes in creditor 
rights on the subsequent corporate risk-taking.   
 
3.2. Creditor rights and diversification in M&A activity 
 
Our first set of tests is based on measuring corporate risk reduction through 
diversifying acquisitions. The data on acquisitions is obtained from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC)’s Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions database for the period 1994-
2004.  Our sample consists of 38 countries with data on creditor rights as of 1994 and that 
satisfy the requirements on transactions specified below.  We include mergers where both 
the acquirer and the target are in the same country, being under the same jurisdiction as it 
applies to creditor rights.  (Separately, we present evidence on the effect of creditor rights 
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on the likelihood of cross-industry acquisitions in cross-border transactions.) We exclude 
acquisitions where the acquirer is in the financial industry (SIC header 6) or a regulated 
industry (SIC headers 48 and 49), because many of these acquisitions are likely to be 
motivated by regulatory requirements and thus differ from those presented in our model.  
Also, acquirers in LBOs are often classified as being in the financial industry. We further 
exclude transactions where the acquirer and the target are the same company (repurchases 
recorded as acquisitions), transactions where the acquirer is a mutual company, 
investment company, subsidiary, or state-owned enterprise, and transactions in which the 
percentage acquired from the target is less than 20 percent.14  Finally, we begin by 
including only countries with at least 50 transactions that satisfy the above criteria, but 
additional data requirement on transaction value reduces the sample size for some 
countries. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. 
 
We test Hypothesis I by estimating the likelihood of same-industry acquisition in 
a country as a function of the creditor rights in that country, controlling for other 
variables. By our hypothesis, this likelihood should be negatively related to creditor 
rights. We define a diversifying acquisition as one where the acquirer and target are not 
in the same industry (using 2-digit SIC code).15  Comment and Jarrell (1995) show that 
focused firms (firms whose revenue is concentrated in a fewer business segments) have 
significantly higher idiosyncratic risk.  Hence, diversifying acquisitions reduce risk by 
reducing revenue concentration.  We do the analysis at both the individual acquisitions 
level (Table 3) and at the aggregate country level, examining the proportion of the same-
industry domestic mergers among all domestic mergers in the sample period (Tables 4 
and 5). 
The main explanatory variable in our analysis is CRIGHTS, the aggregate 
measure of creditor rights from La Porta et al. (1998), and its components, AUTOSTAY, 
                                                 
14 Our results are robust to setting the cutoff at 10% acquired or to adopting more conservative criteria, following Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), of the acquisition being at least 51% of the target company, the transaction value is at least 1 million 
US$, the transaction represents at least 1% of the total assets of the acquirer, and the transaction is completed within three years of the 
announcement of the deal.  
15 The results are qualitatively similar when we employ industry classification at the 3-digit SIC level. 
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REORG, SECURED and MANAGES.  We predict that the coefficient of CRIGHTS is 
negative, that is, lower likelihood of same-industry mergers in countries with stronger 
creditor rights.  
The control variables include shareholder rights index, SHRIGHTS (obtained from 
LaPorta et al. (1998)). If diversifying (focusing) mergers are in shareholder interest, after 
controlling for creditor rights, this variable should have a negative (positive) coefficient.  
We also include variables that proxy for the development and efficiency of the capital 
market (see La Porta et al., 1997): Log(Market Cap), the value of securities on the 
national stock markets in 1994 in U.S. dollars, in logarithm,16 Accounting Disclosure, 
measured by the extent to which the firm’s financial statement includes 90 items (as of 
1994), and Rule of Law,  an index that captures better enforcement of legal rights in a 
country. The effect of these variables should be positive if the internal capital market in 
conglomerates is a valuable substitute for outside capital markets which is less efficient.  
Similarly, Emerging Market dummy variable (= 1 if the country has GDP-per-capita 
below the sample median) should have a negative coefficient if the conglomerate internal 
capital market is a valuable substitute for the less developed outside capital market.  
Flexibility to Fire (an index of rules and regulations reflecting the ease of firing workers) 
proxies for the efficiency of the labor market, which may affect the type of mergers. 
Legal Origin, following La Porta et al., (1998), which influences creditor- and 
shareholder rights and, as Claessens and Klapper (2005) find, interact with the likelihood 
of bankruptcies in a country. The sources for these three legal control variables are 
Levine and Demirguc-Kunt (2001) and LaPorta et al. (1998).   
Additional controls are the country’s macroeconomic volatility, MacroRisk, 
measured by the standard deviation of quarterly changes in the country’s index of 
industrial production.  It has negative coefficient if managers in riskier countries do more 
diversifying mergers. We also include the country’s average real GDP per-capita over 
1994-2000 (in logarithm) from the Penn World Table Version 6.1 as a proxy for the 
degree of economic development, because developed and developing countries may have 
different investment opportunity sets. In the individual transaction regression (Table 3), 
                                                 
16 Our results are robust to an alternative definition of capital market development, using the ratio of the market capitalization to the 
GDP as of 1994. However, this definition of capital market development ranks Malaysia, Hong Kong and South Africa at the top 
while the U.S. ranks in eighth place, after Chile; and, equally strangely,  Japan is ranked thirteenth, after Thailand and the Philippines. 
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we also include Transaction Value (the amount paid in U.S. dollars, in logarithm) and a 
measure of the leverage of both acquirer and target, thus accounting for financial risk.   
We include the leverage of the acquirer and of the target firms because the 
acquirer automatically assumes the target’s liabilities after the merger and therefore its 
acquisition decision should take that into account.  Leverage represents financial distress 
risk which should also induce diversifying mergers.  Therefore, we expect the 
coefficients of leverage to be negative. In estimation, we face a data limitation. Over 45% 
of the acquirers in our sample and 88% of the target firms do not have accounting 
information. Consequently, leverage data on both acquirer and target are available for 
only 2,586 transactions, about 8% of the sample (without the U.S. and the U.K, we have 
only 746 transactions with leverage data.)  In addition, a firm’s leverage in any country is 
partly endogenous to the country’s creditor rights. We therefore use estimated leverage 
variables, derived from an instrumental variables regression.  For all transactions with 
data on leverage (defined as total liabilities net of equity and deferred taxes, divided by 
total assets) for both acquirer and target, we estimate a regression of acquiring firm’s 
leverage on all country-level control variables and on two exogenous variables, the ranks 
(in quartiles) of the U.S. median leverage and the U.S. median tangibility (the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets) for the industry of acquiring firm over the years 1992-2004. 
The U.S. has low level of creditor rights (CRIGHTS= 1) which implies a less-constrained 
choice of leverage, and it has the most data on all industries, making the estimation more 
reliable. Thus, the leverage of an acquirer firm in any industry in any country is imputed 
based on the estimated leverage in that country and industry, obtained from a model of 
the acquirer’s leverage as a function of two exogenous industry variables, using U.S. 
data, and of the acquirer’s own country’s exogenous control variables.  Target firms’ 
leverage is imputed in a similar way. We estimate a leverage model for targets for which 
we have data, and then use this model to impute the leverage of any target in a country 
and industry. 
We estimate a probit model where the dependent variable pertains to transaction j 
in country c, 
 
Pr(same industry merger)j,c =  α*CRIGHTSc+ control variables.          (7) 
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The dependent variable equals 1 if acquirer and target are in the same 2-digit industry. 
Our hypothesis implies that α < 0. The model includes year dummy variables and the 
estimation clusters standard errors by country. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. 
 
The results in Table 3 support our hypothesis. The coefficient of CRIGHTS is negative 
and statistically significant (column 1), meaning that stronger creditor rights are 
associated with greater propensity to diversify (lower probability of same-industry 
merger).  The results remain the same when we exclude the U.S. (column 6) or both the 
U.S. and the U.K. (column 7), that have by far the largest number of acquisitions.  The 
creditor rights component with the most negative effect is MANAGES, underscoring the 
importance of managerial dismissal in bankruptcy as an inducement to diversify.  Based 
on Columns (1), (6) and (7) of Table 3, the marginal effect of CRIGHTS on the 
propensity to acquire same-industry target, evaluated at mean CRIGHTS (“local 
elasticity”), is – 9.49% when all countries are included, – 16.14% when the U.S. is 
excluded, and – 16.48% when both the U.S. and the U.K. are excluded. 
Shareholder rights have a positive effect which is significant when the U.S. is 
excluded, suggesting that shareholders’ interests induce focusing acquisitions, after 
controlling for the effect of creditor rights. The coefficient of Log(Market Cap) is 
positive, which is consistent with the proposition that in countries with strong capital 
markets, there is a greater likelihood of focused firms and the conglomerate mergers are 
less needed. However, when excluding the U.S. and the UK, the coefficient of 
Log(Market Cap) becomes negative and insignificant, suggesting no relationship between 
capital market development and conglomeration. The positive coefficient of Emerging 
Market (the poorer countries) and the negative coefficient of GDP per capita both mean 
that diversification is more likely in richer countries. If capital markets are more 
developed in richer countries, this is evidence against the importance of internal capital 
markets in conglomerates. (However, see results in the country-level regressions.)  
Accounting Disclosure, which is another aspect of developed capital market, has negative 
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effect on same-industry mergers, suggesting again that in more developed capital markets 
there are more conglomerate mergers. However, the positive coefficient of Rule of Law, 
which might be associated with capital market development, is consistent with the 
importance of internal corporate capital markets in countries with weak markets.  The 
variable Flexibility to Fire has insignificant effect when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  
The effect of the country’s MacroRisk is inconclusive, switching signs and changing 
significance depending on whether the U.S. and the U.K. are is included or not. Target’s 
Leverage has a significant negative effect on the propensity to do same-industry mergers, 
suggesting that high financial distress risk induces diversification. Reinforcing this effect, 
Acquirer’s leverage too has negative and marginally significant coefficient when 
excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  
We do four robustness checks, for which we report he main findings.  In the first, 
we control for whether the propensity to do same-industry mergers is affected by antitrust 
laws. We add to the model a variable that is a score of the antitrust law as it pertains to 
mergers from Hylton and Deng (2007).17  We find that this variable is not statistically 
significant. Still, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is negative and significant (t = 6.36 for all 
countries, t = 3.66 when excluding the U.S. and the UK).  The second robustness check 
examines the effect of cultural differences, following Stulz and Williamson (2003), by 
controlling for the religious composition of the country’s population.  Our results on the 
effect of creditor rights and its components are qualitatively unchanged.  In the third 
robustness check, we admit to the sample only acquisitions of at least 90% of the target.  
Then, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is –0.141 with t = 5.11 (29,002 observations), and 
when excluding the U.S. and the UK the coefficient of CRIGHTS is –0.251 with t = 3.73 
(12,415 observations).  Finally, we test the effect of the means of financing the 
acquisition by adding a dummy variable that equals 1 for cash-only transactions.  This 
variable is naturally endogenous. Its effect is insignificant in all regressions.  Still, the 
coefficient of CRIGHTS remains negative and highly significant.  
 
                                                 
17 This variable, which is available for the end of our sample period (for 2004), is used for lack of another index, assuming that the 
anti-trust law hardly changes over our sample period. Hylton and Deng’s list includes 35 countries that overlap with ours, to which we 
add data on Hong Kong and Singapore (the latter has data for 2006). We miss data for Malaysia.  
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Cross-border acquisitions: So far we analyzed domestic acquisitions, where 
both bidder and target firms are under the same legal regime. We now present results for 
cross-border acquisitions – i.e., where bidder and target are in different country – 
assuming that the applicable legal regime and country variables pertain to the country of 
the acquirer, which is the entity that usually decides on the acquisition. In particular, we 
use the creditor rights in the acquirer’s country.  The analysis includes acquirers from the 
38 countries in our sample. Some of the target firms are in these 38 countries, while other 
target firms come from countries for which we do not have data on creditor rights. 
The estimation methodology for cross-border acquisitions replicates that of Table 
3, with the same variables.  The dependent variable equals 1 if both bidder and target are 
in the same 2-digit SIC code industry and 0 otherwise. The explanatory country variables 
use data from the acquirer’s country.  We have 19,754 acquisitions which satisfy the 
other criteria we set for including an acquisition in our analysis and 10,532 acquisitions 
when excluding acquirers from the U.S. and the UK.  
The estimation results support our hypothesis on the negative effect of creditor 
rights on same-industry acquisitions.  For sake of parsimony, we present only the 
coefficients of the creditor rights variables and components.18 The following are the 
estimated coefficients and their t statistics: 
CRIGHTS –0.104 (t = 5.77).  [Excluding the U.S. and the UK: –0.300 (t = 5.79).] 
AUTOSTAY –0.284 (t = 5.50). 
REORG –0.259 (t = 5.37). 
SECURED –0.200 (t = 3.51). 
MANAGES –0.238 (t = 5.49). 
 
Reverting to analysis that focuses on within-country mergers, the next test of our 
hypothesis is at the aggregate country level, where each country is one observation. Here, 
large and small countries are treated alike. We calculate for each country c the measure 
SAMEc = [(mergers in the same 2-digit SIC code industry)/ (all domestic mergers)].  We 
then estimate the following model by the tobit method, with 38 observations (countries): 
 
                                                 
18 A detailed table is available from the authors upon request. 
22 
 
SAMEc = β0 + β1*CRIGHTSc + control variables.            (8) 
 
INSTER TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of model (8), which again support our 
hypothesis that β1 < 0.  The coefficient of CRIGHTS is negative and significant (column 
1) and, as in Table 3, the most important component is MANAGES, the indicator of 
managerial dismissal in bankruptcy.  Figure 2 plots the variable SAME for different 
countries as a function of their CRIGHTS and also shows the best fit implied by column 
(1) of Table 4, showing the negative relationship between strength of creditor rights and 
the extent of same-industry mergers.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. 
 
The negative effect of creditor rights is also robust in Column (6) of Table 4 when 
we account for changes in CRIGHTS that occurred in 5 countries during the sample 
period by using a weighted average of the CRIGHTS index, the weight being the number 
of transactions in the years following the year of change in one of the components 
(because the effect of a change is reflected in transactions in subsequent years).19 The 
positive and significant coefficient of SHRIGHTS suggests that focusing mergers are in 
shareholder interest, after controlling for creditor rights. 
As to the importance of internal capital markets in conglomerates, again results 
are mixed. The coefficient of Log(Market Cap) is negative and quite insignificant. If 
internal capital markets were valuable in countries with weak capital markets, the 
coefficient should have been positive. The negative coefficient of Log(GDP per Capita) 
suggests that in richer countries whose capital markets are usually more developed, 
conglomerate mergers are more rather than less likely. Also, the coefficient of 
Accounting Disclosure, which is usually related to capital market development, has a 
negative and insignificant coefficient. The above evidence is not consistent with the 
importance of internal capital markets. However, the coefficient of Emerging Market is 
                                                 
19 The calculation of this variable employs the time series data of the CRIGHTS components in Djankov et al. (2007a).  
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now negative and significant, implying that in the group of poorer countries (with less 
developed capital markets), conglomerate mergers are more likely.   This suggests a non-
monotonic effect of GDP per capita on the likelihood of same-industry mergers. And, the 
coefficient of Rule of Law is positive, as in Table 3, suggesting that in countries with 
better enforcement, which improves the functioning of capital markets, there is greater 
likelihood of focused acquisitions which do not broaden internal capital markets. 
Altogether, there is mixed evidence on the effect of the country’s capital market 
development on the propensity to form conglomerates which enable internal capital 
markets.  
As a robustness check we add as explanatory variable the merger-related antitrust 
index of Hylton and Deng (2007). Its coefficient is statistically insignificant, while the 
coefficient of CRIGHTS remains negative and significant. In another test, we split the 
sample period into two, 1994-1999 and 2000-2004, calculate SAMEc for each subperiod 
and estimate the relationship between SAMEc and CRIGHTSc across countries for both 
subperiods. We exclude one sub-period for a given country if it has less than 30 
transactions in that sub-period. The results again support our hypothesis: CRIGHTS have 
a significant negative effect on the proportion of same-industry mergers, with a 
coefficient of –0.025 (t = 2.05).  These results are available upon request.  
 
3.3. The effects of changes in creditor rights on diversification in M&A activity 
 
Our analysis so far shows a negative cross-country association between a 
country’s creditor rights and the propensity of firms to do same-industry acquisitions.  
During our sample period, six countries changed their creditor rights.  This enables us to 
examine the effect of changes in creditor rights: does weakening of creditor rights reduce 
the propensity of firms to diversify? 
The countries with changes in creditor rights are Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Sweden, 
Thailand and Russia.20  All these changes imply a decrease in CRIGHTS by one unit, 
except for the 2002 change in Russia that increased CRIGHTS by one unit.  The changes 
were motivated by financial crises (Indonesia, Russia, and Thailand), the need to collect 
                                                 
20 Russia is included only in this table’s regressions, not in any other estimation, because it has a unique legal origin. Its inclusion with 
a unique dummy variable for its legal origin will not change any of the results reported.  
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state tax (Russia, 1998) or emulation of the U.S. in transforming from a centrally-
controlled economy.  
We estimate the following regression, a variant of model (7): 
 
Pr(same industry merger)c = α*ΔCRIGHTSc + control variables.        (9) 
 
In case of CRIGHTSc becoming weaker, ΔCRIGHTSc = 0 during the year of the 
change and the years that follow, and ΔCRIGHTSc = 1 during the period that precedes it, 
when CRIGHTS are stronger. Similarly, if CRIGHTSc were strengthened, ΔCRIGHTSc = 
1 during the period when CRIGHTS are stronger compared to the previous period of 
weaker CRIGHTS, during which ΔCRIGHTSc = 0.  As discussed, all changes in 
CRIGHTS during the sample period but one made them weaker. For most countries in our 
sample, ΔCRIGHTS = 0 for the entire sample period (i.e., no change).  Our hypothesis 
that stronger creditor rights induce diversification implies that α < 0.  
 The control variables are Transaction Value (in logarithm), both year and industry 
fixed effects and, importantly, country fixed effects in line with the difference-in-
differences methodology.  We estimate the regression by a probit method with 29,548 
observations,21 with standard errors clustered at the country level to account for potential 
within-country correlation in the residuals. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. 
 
The regression results in Table 5 show that, as hypothesized, the coefficient of 
ΔCRIGHTSc is negative and statistically significant: α = –0.19 (t = 3.16). The results thus 
support our hypothesis that changes in CRIGHTS which weaken them reduce the 
propensity of firms to diversify through mergers and acquisitions. 
 
                                                 
21 Our observation count in the creditor-rights-changes regression is lower than in Table 3 because of data requirement: having 
creditor rights data from Djankov et al. (2007a) on an annual basis for the sample period 1994-2004. This study’s data however ends 
in 2002. 
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3.4. Creditor rights and firms’ cash flow risk 
We now test hypothesis II on the relationship between corporate cash flow risk 
and creditor rights. In addition to doing diversifying acquisitions, firms can reduce their 
risk by other means which are not directly observed.  We therefore measure directly the 
level of corporate risk and relate it to the creditor rights in the country. 
The risk of operating cash flows of firm j in country c, RISKj,c, is the industry-
adjusted standard deviation of ROAj,c,t = (EBITDAj,c,t /ASSETSj,c,t), where EBITDAj,c,t is 
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization (the sum of data items 
#14 and #11),22 and ASSETSi,c,t is the contemporaneous total assets (data item #89). The 
source is Compustat Global Vantage and all data are annual. The sample period is 1992-
2005, and ROAj,c,t is winsorized at 0.5% in both tails of the distribution to account for 
possible data errors and large outliers.  In computing the standard deviation we use 
industry-adjusted ROAj,c,t, obtained by subtracting from ROAj,c,t its industry median (2-
digit SIC code) for that year. The entire sample of RISKj,c is again winsorized at 1% in 
both tails of its distribution to eliminate outliers. We include only firms in the 
manufacturing industries with data for at least eight years. 23  
 The model that estimates the effect of creditor rights on firms’ risk is as follows: 
 
RISKj,c = γ*CRIGHTSj,c + control variables.                      (10) 
 
Our hypothesis implies γ < 0. We again estimate this model at both the firm level 
(Table 6) and the country level (Table7), the latter using the median risk of the firms in 
the country. The control variables are those used in Table 3, but also adding firm size (the 
logarithm of firm’s initial total assets, as of the beginning of its data in our sample) which 
negatively correlates with risk.  
We estimate the model of single-firm risk level as a panel regression, with 
country-clustered standard errors. This regression includes 35 countries due to 
insufficient data in three countries (we require at least 6 firms with the required series of 
accounting data in a country), giving us a total of 5,394 firms for the firm-level analysis.  
                                                 
22 We use EBITDA rather than EBIT because countries differ in the way they recognize accounting depreciation, which affect the 
smoothing of earnings over time. 
23 We exclude utilities and financial firms which are regulated in many countries, and this could affect their risk. 
26 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE. 
 
The results in Table 6 support our hypothesis: the coefficient γ of RISKj,c on 
CRIGHTSc is negative and statistically significant. As in the earlier results on same-
industry mergers (Tables 3-5), the most significant component of CRIGHTS that 
negatively affect RISK is managerial dismissal (MANAGES). The results on the effect of 
CRIGHTS are qualitatively unchanged when excluding the U.S. and the U.K. (columns 
(6) and (7)).  Among the control variables, firms with high financial risk, measured by 
higher leverage choose to have lower cash flow risk.  Leverage is instrumented because 
of its endogeneity; the instruments are, as in Table 3, the country control variables and 
two exogenous variables, the U.S. industry rank of leverage and tangibility, for the 
industry to which firm j belongs.  Large firms have lower risk, as expected. As to country 
variables, higher Macro Risk has positive effect on RISKj,c, as expected, although its 
significant is marginal when excluding the U.S. and the U.K.  The effect of capital 
market development, as measured by Log(Market Cap), is positive although it is 
insignificant when excluding the U.S. and the U.K. the coefficient of Flexibility to fire is 
positive, which is puzzling because flexible employment should enable firms to reduce 
their operating leverage and thus reduce risk. However, the coefficient of this variable 
becomes negative and insignificant in the next estimation of the model in a country-level 
regression. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE. 
 
 Table 7 presents test results on the RISK-CRIGHTS relationship at the country 
level, where each country is a single observation and they are all treated alike. The 
dependent variable, RISK*c, is the country average of the individual firms’ industry-
adjusted risk, RISKj,c. The results again support our hypothesis. The coefficient γ of 
CRIGHTS (in equation (10), estimated at the country level) is negative and significant at 
better than 5%, even though we have only 22 degrees of freedom. As before, the 
strongest effect is due to the component MANAGES, with AUTOSTAY being also 
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significantly negative.  Of the country control variables, notably Log(Market Cap) retains 
its negative effect, though its statistical significance is marginal. 
 We have thus established evidence through an independent test that in countries 
with stronger creditor rights, firms have lower operating risk. 
 
3.5. Industry-adjusted propensity to reduce risk  
 
It should be noted that countries differ in the composition of their industries.  To 
check robustness of our result to this cross-country difference, we now replicate the two 
previous tests – the effect of creditor rights on same-industry acquisitions and on firms’ 
risk – in a context of industries, following Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) methodology.  
We examine the effect of CRIGHTS on the realized firm characteristic – the propensity to 
do same-industry acquisitions and to select some level of risk – given the inherent level 
of this characteristic in the industry.   As in Rajan and Zingales (1998), the proxy for the 
inherent industry characteristic is the respective characteristic in the U.S. Notably, 
CRIGHTS in the U.S. is low (it equals 1), and hence the industry characteristics in it are 
relatively less likely to manifest aversion to risk-taking induced by strong creditors’ 
rights.  In addition, the U.S. has the most developed capital market, the most active 
takeover market and relatively few constraints on corporate behavior.  
 
3.5.1. The propensity to do same-industry acquisitions 
 
We measure the inherent propensity to do same-industry acquisitions by 
SAMEk,US, the proportion in the U.S. of firms in industry k acquiring firms in the same 
industry (using 2-digit SIC code), calculated for the period 1994-1997. SAMEk,c is 
similarly the proportion of same-industry acquisitions of acquirers in industry k in 
country c for the subsequent period, 1998-2004.  We include an industry from a given 
country if it has at least six qualified transactions during the period 1998-2004. Following 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we estimate the model (by the tobit method) 
 
SAMEk,c = β0 +β1*SAMEk,US +β2*CRIGHTSc* SAMEk,US  +Country fixed effects   (11) 
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The country fixed effects control for country-specific characteristics. There are 623 
industry-country observations, and SAMEk,c excludes the U.S. The estimation is a panel 
regression with standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Our hypothesis is that β2 < 0: stronger creditor rights in a country reduce the 
propensity to do same-industry mergers, after accounting for the industry’s inherent level 
of such mergers.  Naturally, we expect β1 > 0 if the likelihood of same-industry mergers 
in industry k in country c is positively related to that in the U.S.   
The results support our hypothesis (to save space, we report only the coefficients 
relevant to our hypothesis): 
(a) β1 = 1.310 (t = 9.83).  
(b) β2 = –0.263 (t = 7.56).  R2 = 25.0%.   
These results imply that stronger creditor rights in a country increase the likelihood of 
cross-industry, diversifying acquisitions compared to the inherent likelihood of such 
acquisitions in the same industry, measured by data from the U.S.  
 
3.5.2. The average level operating risk in an industry  
 
We now apply the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology to study the relationship 
between creditor rights and RISKk,c, the median standard deviation of annual ROA of 
firms in industry k in country c (using 2-digit SIC code).  The inherent risk level in 
industry k is measured by RISKk,US, the median risk level in the same industry in the U.S.  
RISKk,US is calculated for the period 1992-1998 and RISKk,c for all other countries is 
calculated over the subsequent period 1999-2005.24  (In this industry-based test we use 
ROA which is not industry adjusted.)  We include industries with at least three firms with 
available RISKj,k,c measure, which requires at least five years of data. We then estimate 
the following regression: 
 
RISKk,c = δ0 + δ1*RISkk,US + δ2*CRIGHTSc*RISKk,US + Country fixed effects    (12) 
 
                                                 
24 The results are qualitatively unchanged when the variables for both the U.S. and all other countries are calculated over the entire 
sample period, 1992-2005. 
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The country fixed effects control for country’s characteristics. There are 802 industry-
country observations excluding the U.S. The estimation is a panel regression with 
standard errors clustered at the country level.  
We hypothesize that δ2 < 0:  the industry’s corporate cash flow risk is lower in 
countries with stronger creditor rights, after accounting for the industry’s inherent risk 
level, measured by the U.S. risk level in that industry. We also expect δ1 > 0, implying 
similarity between the industry risk in the U.S. and that in other countries. 
The results are again consistent with our hypothesis: 
(a) δ1 = 0.862 (t = 4.49).  
(b) δ2 = –0.158 (t = 2.16).  R2 = 30.2%.   
The results thus show that stronger creditor rights significantly reduce the industry cash 
flow risk compared to the same-industry risk in the U.S.    
 
3.6. Risk reduction and industry recovery rates 
 
Our final test of the effect of creditor rights on corporate behavior, which is different 
from the two tests done so far, examines the choice of target in a merger or acquisition by 
the recovery rate of its assets in default (henceforth recovery). The recovery rate here is 
the extent that the price of the assets sold in distress is close to the value of the asset in its 
best use, following the definition of (inverse of) asset-specificity in Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992).  A firm with high-recovery assets can better deal with financial distress by 
partially liquidating such assets and using the proceeds to defer default. This increases the 
value of the call option embedded in the firm’s equity.  An acquirer in low-recovery 
industry, being more vulnerable to default, would seek high-recovery assets that can be 
more easily liquidated in time of financial distress.   
We thus test whether creditor rights influence the type of target firm that a low-
recover bidder seeks. The dependent variable in this test is Pr(TH∩AL|TH): the 
probability of the event TH∩AL, defined as a low-recovery acquirer (AL) buying a high-
recovery target (TH), within the set of all TH transactions, i.e., acquisitions of high-
recovery targets.  We thus estimate the following model:  
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Pr(TH∩AL|TH)j,c =  b*CRIGHTSc+ control variables.    (13) 
 
We hypothesize that b > 0.  We assign to firms the recovery level of the industry in which 
they operate, using the data in Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007, Table 2) which 
employs historical experience on defaults in the U.S. over the period 1982-1999.  Low 
recovery industries (in terms of 2-SIC code headers) are: transportation (37, 40, 41, 42, 
44, 45, 46, 47), high technology and office equipment (35, 36, 38), consumer/service 
sector (52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79), and leisure time/media (27, 
48, 70).  High recovery industries are: energy and natural resources (10, 12, 13, 14, 24), 
building products/ homebuilders (8, 15, 17, 24, 28, 29, 32, 34), and healthcare/chemicals 
(28, 80.)25  In the estimation model, the universe is all targets with high recovery, and the 
bidders are either low-recovery (dependent variable = 1), or high recovery (dependent 
variable = 0). The control variables used are those used in Tables 3 and 6. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
 The results in Table 8 support our hypothesis. The coefficient of CRIGHTS is 
positive and significant for the entire sample as well as when excluding the U.S. and the 
U.K., which constitute more than half the sample (columns (6-10)). All components of 
creditor rights have positive coefficients, and except for SECURED they are statistically 
significant.  That is, stronger creditor rights induce greater likelihood of an acquisition of 
high-asset-recovery firms by low-recovery firms. The relatively large coefficient of 
MANAGES underscores the evidence in Eckbo and Thornburn (2003) cited in Section 3 
while presenting our hypotheses. The MacroRisk has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
low-recovery firms acquiring high-recovery firms, which is consistent with the view that 
such acquisitions are desired as means to reduce risk.  
We also estimate the model as a country-level regression, where the dependent 
variable is the proportion of all high-recovery targets in the country acquired by low-
recovery bidders (we use logistic transformation).  In this regression, each country is a 
single observation, regardless of the number of transactions in it. For sake of parsimony, 
                                                 
25 We have alternatively followed Dyck and Zingales (2004) and characterized as low recovery rate industries the following ones: 
mining, manufacturing, and transportation. Our results are similar. 
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we do not present the table.  The results are consistent with those of single-acquisition 
regressions.  In this estimation, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is 0.288 with t = 3.37, highly 
significant.26 
This test provides additional evidence that creditor rights affect the choice of 
investment – here, an acquisition target – particularly by low-recovery acquirers, which 
seek to acquire high-recovery targets.  As we argue throughout, if investment choices are 
constrained by creditor rights, they may be suboptimal from an overall economic 
viewpoint.  
 
4. Conclusion and Discussion  
 
Employing three different tests and several estimation methods, we find that 
stronger creditor rights in a country induce firms to prefer diversifying acquisitions and 
undertake lower cash flow risk.  If these actions would not have otherwise been taken by 
the firms, it follows that creditor rights have real effect on corporate decisions whose 
value effects may be questionable.   
Stronger creditor rights are justified as means to mitigate stockholders’ 
opportunistic risk shifting policies that benefit themselves at the expense of bondholders 
(and that may be costly to the firm), and thus facilitate raising external capital.  Our 
findings could thus be construed as confirming that creditor rights do what they are 
expected to do: inhibit excessive risk taking by companies. However, if stronger creditor 
rights stifle non-opportunistic risk taking that is beneficial to all claimholders, then 
creditor rights have a “dark side” to them. They may destroy firms’ incentives to 
undertake value-enhancing but risky projects, and may induce firms to do value-reducing 
diversifying acquisitions.  The question is how to strike a balance between these two 
effects of creditor rights. In this paper, we highlight the second aspect, that is, the 
inhibiting effect of creditor rights on risk taking by companies. 
Personal bankruptcy laws in the U.S., which affect unincorporated firms, suggest 
that more severe bankruptcy laws are negatively correlated with entrepreneurship.  It 
could be argued, though, that lenient bankruptcy laws make it harder to raise capital. 
                                                 
26 We further conduct a test in the spirit of this hypothesis, examining the proportion among all low-recovery bidders that seek high-
recovery targets.  In this regression, the effect of CRIGHTS is not statistically significant. 
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Berkowitz and White (2004) find that more lenient state bankruptcy laws, measured by 
higher personal bankruptcy exemptions, increases the likelihood of credit rationing and 
higher interest rates.  This effect is particularly strong for firms with low net assets. This 
means that stronger creditor rights increase the supply of funds. 
On the other hand, Fan and White (2003) find that states with more lenient 
bankruptcy laws enjoy higher level of entrepreneurship, measured by the extent of self 
employment. For example, “the probability of households owning businesses is 35% 
higher if they live in states with unlimited rather than low exemptions” (p. 543).  Taking 
these two papers together, the positive credit supply effect of stronger creditors' rights is 
more than offset by the negative effect on risk-taking, as evidenced by the lower supply 
of entrepreneurs when personal bankruptcy laws are stronger. To the extent that 
entrepreneurship is conducive to economic growth, this finding suggests that strong 
creditor rights can be value-destroying. 
International evidence also shows that stronger creditor rights inhibit 
entrepreneurship.  Armour and Cumming (2005) create an index of the severity of 
personal bankruptcy laws in 15 countries, measured by the number of years a bankrupt 
must wait until he may be discharged from his indebtedness (in some cases, there is no 
limit).  They study the effects of bankruptcy laws on the extent of self employment 
relative to the population – a measure of entrepreneurship – both inter-country and intra-
country over the years 1990-2002.  Armour and Cummins find that more severe 
bankruptcy laws reduce the extent of self employment, after controlling for economic 
variables.  They also find that the recent reforms in some European countries’ personal 
bankruptcy laws, which made them more lenient (shorter time to discharge from debt), 
can be credited with the increase in entrepreneurship in these countries. Similarly, 
Acharya and Subramanian (2007) show that in countries with stronger creditor rights, 
technologically innovative industries innovate less, employ lower financial leverage, and 
importantly for welfare conclusions, also grow slower. 
Given this tradeoff, stronger creditor rights are not always optimal. The optimal 
level of creditor rights may thus have to balance the positive effect on debt capacity of 
firms and the negative effect on their investment choices.  In future work, it would be 
interesting to assess directly this important tradeoff.  
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Main 
Variables 
Source 
Risk-
reduction 
measures 
  
PROP Logistic transformation of the share of same industry mergers, per country. We define it as 
follows: PROP = ln [SAME/(1-SAME)]. SAME is the proportion of same 2-digit SIC code industry 
mergers and acquisitions. 
SDC Platinum Mergers 
& Acquisitions. 
Firm risk (RISK)  RISKj,c is the standard deviation of firm j in country c of ROAj,c,t , where ROAj,c,t = EBITDAj,c,t / 
ASSETSj,c,t . t is the year, and we require at least 8 years of data. Data are for the period 1992-2005. 
The entire data of ROAi,c,t is winsorized at 0.5% in both tails to account for extreme observations.  
The entire firm sample of RISKi,c is then winsorized at 1% in both sides of the sample distribution.  
 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/ Commercial 
Annual Database. 
 
Country risk (RISK* )  
 
 
The average of RISKj,c across firms in country c.  
 
Creditor- Rights Variables 
Creditor rights 
(CRIGHTS) 
An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (1998).  It is the sum of the four 
indexes that follow. CRIGHTS then ranges between 0 and 4. 
La Porta et al. (1998), 
Djankov, McLeish, 
and Shleifer (2007a) 
No automatic stay 
(AUTOSTAY) 
Equals one if the reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic stay on the assets of the 
firm upon filing the reorganization petition, creditors are able to seize their collateral after the 
reorganization petition is approved. It equals zero if such restriction does exist in the law. 
 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1998) 
Reorganization (REORG) Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or 
minimum dividend for a debtor to be able to file for reorganization. It equals zero for countries 
without such restriction. 
 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1998) 
Secured debt first 
(SECURED) 
Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from 
the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as employees or 
government. Equals zero if non-secured creditors, such as the government and workers, are given 
absolute priority. 
 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1998) 
No management stay 
(MANAGES) 
Equals one if an official is appointed by the court, or by the creditors, is responsible for the 
operation of the business during reorganization, that is management does not retain administration 
of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. Equivalently, this variable equals one 
if the debtor does not keep the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization process, and zero otherwise. 
 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1998) 
Control 
Variables 
  
Log(GDP-per-capita) Natural logarithm of the average real GDP per capita in US dollars, 1994-2000. Penn World Tables, 
Version 6.1 
Macroeconomic Risk 
(MacroRisk) 
The standard deviation of the quarterly growth in real industrial production for each country in the 
period 1990-2004. For some countries, we use instead the index of manufacturing production: 
Argentina, Chile, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Singapore and 
South Africa. For Argentina, Canada, Taiwan and Thailand, data are from the international 
database of Global Insight. The variable is measured in decimal points.  
International Financial 
Statistics of IMF.  
Rule of Law (LAW) The assessment of the law and order tradition of the country.  Calculated as “average of the months 
of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero to 10, with 
lower scores for less tradition for law and order.” 
International Country 
Risk Guide; La Porta et 
al. (1998). 
Legal Origins A dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of the Company law or Commercial Code of each 
country. The detailed origins are French, German, Nordic (default is Common) 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
and the CIA Factbook 
2003. 
Shareholder rights 
(SHRIGHTS) 
An index that aggregates shareholder rights. “The index is formed by adding one when: (1) the 
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required 
to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent 
(the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a 
shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from zero to six.” 
Quotation is from La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
Leverage Total debt to total assets in book value.  Debt is total liabilities minus equity and minus deferred 
taxes. Leverage data are winsorize in the entire population at 1% in each tail. 
SDC Platinum Mergers &
Acquisitions (for Table 3)
and Bureau Van Dijk’s 
Osiris database (for Table
6) 
 39
Accounting Disclosure An index created by the examination of the annual report in 1994 of companies across countries on 
their inclusion or omission of 90 line items.  
International Accounting 
and Auditing Trends, 
Center for International 
Financial Analysis and 
Research 
Emerging Markets Dummy variable equal to one if the country’s GDP-per-capita (in US$, average over 1994-2000) is 
less than the median for the sample of countries. 
Penn World Tables, 
Version 6.1 
Flexibility to Fire An index of the ease to fire workers based on a study of the employment laws. (divided by 100.) Doing Business Report, 
2004, The World Bank 
Log(Market Cap) The logarithm of the stock market capitalization in U.S. dollars in 1994.  World Market Indicators 
database, The World Bank
Transaction Value  
The amount paid in U.S. dollars. 
SDC Platinum Mergers &
Acquisitions. 
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Table 2. Overall descriptive statistics 
Table 2 describes the total number of domestic mergers in the sample countries for 1994-2004 that enter Table 3 regressions. The sample 
presented consists of the countries for which we have La Porta et al. (1998) data on creditor rights. We exclude countries that have less than 50 
qualified transactions in the sample period. A transaction is qualified if the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. We exclude financial 
industry (SIC header 6) and regulated industry companies (SIC headers 48 and 49) from the country transaction count. The mergers and 
acquisition data is from SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. The year of creditor rights change is the one from the Djankov et 
al. (2007a) study. We also present data on the average country operating risk proxy, RISK*. 
Acquirer’s 
Country 
Year of creditor 
rights change # Mergers  
# Same 
Industry 
Mergers  
Operating 
Risk Proxy 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Creditor 
Rights 
Macroeconom
ic Volatility $ GDP per capita 
  
LAW 
CHANGE COUNT SAME RISK SHRIGHTS CRIGHTS MacroRisk GDP 
Argentina  - 66 55.33% 0.058 4 1 0.07 $7,801  
Australia  - 1,618 61.72% 0.121 4 1 0.04 $20,948  
Austria  - 14 64.52% 0.036 2 3 0.09 $26,220  
Belgium  - 49 57.54% 0.043 0 2 0.08 $24,649  
Brazil  - 143 70.26% 0.07 3 1 0.03 $4,143  
Canada  - 2,071 61.37% 0.094 5 1 0.01 $20,647  
Chile  - 41 61.84% 0.033 5 2 0.04 $4,604  
Denmark  - 80 56.47% 0.049 2 3 0.07 $32,434  
Finland  - 154 54.60% 0.054 3 1 0.08 $23,856  
France  - 434 59.79% 0.045 3 0 0.1 $24,033  
Germany  - 201 55.31% 0.057 1 3 0.04 $26,443  
Greece  - 70 47.22% 0.043 2 1 0.06 $11,219  
Hong Kong  - 190 34.11% 0.064 5 4 0.13 $23,850  
India  - 236 57.87% 0.051 5 4 0.07 $423  
Indonesia  1998 39 60.53% . 2 4 0.07 $868  
Ireland  - 92 63.59% . 4 1 0.08 $21,376  
Israel  1996 73 45.45% 0.075 3 4 0.02 $16,391  
Italy  - 333 53.31% 0.038 1 2 0.12 $19,814  
Japan  2000 1,771 46.80% 0.022 4 2 0.03 $36,616  
Malaysia  - 369 25.27% 0.066 4 4 0.05 $3,982  
Mexico  - 82 62.59% 0.049 1 0 0.03 $4,421  
Netherlands  - 101 57.80% 0.059 2 2 0.11 $24,802  
New Zealand  
- 
98 57.73% 0.073 4 3 0.06 $15,528  
Norway  - 130 58.94% 0.079 4 2 0.07 $33,844  
Peru  - 26 68.63% 0.058 3 0 0.07 $2,296  
Philippines  - 42 56.00% 0.08 3 0 0.18 $1,041  
Portugal  - 56 65.31% 0.036 3 1 0.06 $10,782  
Singapore  - 243 32.19% 0.064 4 4 0.06 $22,916  
South Africa  
- 
372 49.84% 0.061 5 3 0.02 $3,413  
South Korea  - 198 32.48% 0.051 2 3 0.06 $9,545  
Spain  - 338 64.08% 0.04 4 2 0.08 $14,535  
Sweden  1996 186 58.53% 0.067 3 2 0.16 $26,812  
Switzerland  - 38 57.67% 0.046 2 1 0.07 $37,908  
Taiwan  - 52 44.90% 0.039 3 2 0.06 $12,580  
Thailand  1999 83 43.95% 0.065 2 3 0.05 $2,396  
Turkey  - 17 50.00% 0.097 2 2 0.07 $2,810  
United 
Kingdom  
- 
5,624 58.61% 0.071 5 4 0.05 $21,767  
United States  
- 
17,491 59.07% 0.088 5 1 0.01 $30,899  
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Table 3.  Merger-level analysis: proportion of same-industry mergers 
The table presents the coefficient estimates from probit regressions. The dependent variable equals 1 if both acquirer and target are in the same 
industry, using 2-digit SIC code. A country is included in our sample if it has at least 50 qualified transactions over the sample period. A 
transaction is included if the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. Excluded are transactions where the acquirer is from the financial 
industry (SIC header 6) or regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 49).  CRIGHTS are as of 1994. The control variables include shareholder rights, 
rule of law, macroeconomic risk, legal origins, the logarithm of the stock market capitalization, the index of flexibility to fire, the quality of 
accounting disclosure, an emerging market indicator, the logarithm of average real GDP-per-capita (1994-2000) in US$, the logarithm of 
transaction value, and the imputed leverage for the acquirer and the target (the predictors are the U.S. industry quartile rank of the median 
leverage and median tangibility, and all exogenous control variables). All variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions include year fixed 
effects (not reported). Models (1) through (5) include all countries. Model (6) excludes the U.S. Model (7) excludes both the U.S. and the U.K. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust estimation of standard errors with errors cluster-adjusted at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994-2004. 
Variable All countries Exclude U.S.  
Exclude U.S. 
and U.K.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CRIGHTS -0.245***      -0.411***  -0.420***  
 (6.33)     (3.66) (3.56) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.415***        
  (5.74)       
REORG   -0.524***       
   (5.18)      
SECURED    -0.318***      
    (3.78)     
MANAGES     -0.848***     
     (6.89)    
SHRIGHTS 0.022 -0.002 0.012 0.029 0.143***  0.218***  0.112***  
 (0.91) (0.08) (0.46) (1.16) (5.38) (4.00) (2.88) 
Log (Market cap) 0.293***  0.247***  0.266***  0.207***  0.225***  0.134***  -0.035 
 (6.48) (5.94) (6.01) (5.56) (6.20) (3.09) (0.87) 
Flexibility to fire 0.836** 1.077***  1.37***  0.993** -0.262 0.503 -0.449 
 (2.15) (2.68) (3.32) (2.41) (0.67) (1.17) (0.94) 
Accounting 
disclosure -0.026***  -0.033***  -0.030***  -0.047***  -0.011** -0.024***  -0.035***  
 (4.46) (5.23) (4.82) (6.26) (2.21) (3.09) (4.31) 
Emerging Market 0.661***  0.421***  0.505***  0.303***  0.653***  1.932***  0.956** 
 (5.99) (4.75) (5.27) (4.25) (6.08) (3.42) (2.58) 
Rule of Law 0.375***  0.544***  0.362***  0.445***  0.026 0.952***  0.600***  
 (5.79) (7.85) (5.66) (6.87) (0.34) (4.13) (4.33) 
French Legal Origin -0.388***  -0.189* -0.305** -0.224** 0.0004 0.213 0.009 
 (2.87) (1.71) (2.52) (2.10) (0.01) (1.61) (0.07) 
German Legal Origin -0.613***  -0.86***  -0.950***  -0.968***  0.101 1.087** 0.673* 
 (9.32) (9.96) (10.58) (10.49) (1.00) (2.35) (1.69) 
Nordic Legal Origin 1.167***  0.903***  1.245***  1.097***  1.212***  2.458***  1.393** 
  (5.3) (4.49) (5.33) (5.10) (5.70) (3.33) (2.58) 
MacroRisk -0.207 -2.945***  -1.841** -6.312***  -0.803 4.755** 1.765 
 (0.22) (3.18) (1.96) (6.76) (0.97) (2.15) (1.13) 
Log(GDP perCapita)  -0.178***  -0.199***  -0.097** -0.055 -0.152***  -0.423***  -0.354***  
  (3.37) (3.71) (2.04) (1.20) (3.09) (3.13) (3.35) 
Log(Transaction 
Value) 0.086***  0.090***  0.091***  0.096***  0.083***  0.083** 0.064***  
 (5.41) (5.47) (5.47) (5.52) (5.30) (2.29) (2.85) 
Acquirer’s Leverage 
(imputed)  1.746* 1.755 1.734 1.737 1.754* -0.486 -1.376* 
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 (1.69) (1.68) (1.64) (1.64) (1.70) (0.35) (1.75) 
Target’s Leverage 
(imputed)   -7.647***  -7.861***  -8.062***  -8.251***  -7.584***  -13.957***  -7.7** 
 (6.13) (6.14) (6.17) (6.17) (6.09) (3.51) (2.57) 
Number of countries 38 38 38 38 38 37 36 
Observations 33,221 33,221 33,221 33,221 33,221 15,730 10,106 
Chi-squared 4,449.7 4,279.3 1,696.8 1,375.8 5,870.4 1,838.4 2,079.4 
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Table 4. Country-level analysis: proportion of same-industry mergers 
The dependent variable is the fraction of same-industry mergers (2-digit SIC code) out of all mergers in the country. A country is included in our 
sample if it has at least 50 qualified transactions over the sample period. A qualified transaction is where at least 20% of the target is acquired.  
Excluded are acquirers from the financial industry (SIC header 6) and regulated industry companies (SIC headers 48 and 49). The sample period is 
1994-2004. Number of observations is 38 (countries). Variables are defined in Table 1. Model (6) uses a value-weighted average of the country 
creditor rights time series (from Djankov et al. (2007a)), where the weights are the number of M&A transactions within a given country in the 
subsequent year. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. All models are based on tobit estimates where we allow for 
truncation of the dependent variable at 0 and 1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CRIGHTS -0.030***        
 (3.28)      
Average CRIGHTS      -0.02** 
      (2.18) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.056**      
  (2.48)      
REORG   -0.017     
   (0.74)     
SECURED    -0.022    
    (1.25)    
MANAGES     -0.100***     
     (4.41)   
SHRIGHTS 0.015** 0.013* 0.021***   0.021***   0.018***   0.018** 
 (2.48) (1.80) (2.86) (2.73) (3.01) (2.57) 
Log (Market cap) -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.72) (0.63) (0.46) (0.37) (0.89) (0.64) 
Flexibility to fire 0.197***   0.255***   0.28***   0.285***   0.224***   0.241***   
 (2.88) (3.51) (3.88) (3.40) (3.23) (3.11) 
Accounting disclosure -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.29) (1.58) (1.21) (1.17) (0.73) (1.20) 
Emerging Market -0.21***   -0.212***   -0.206***   -0.199***   -0.185***   -0.201***   
 (5.10) (4.90) (4.25) (4.29) (4.35) (4.61) 
Rule of Law 0.055***   0.056** 0.052** 0.054** 0.028 0.057** 
 (2.83) (2.54) (2.31) (2.19) (1.56) (2.56) 
French Legal Origin 0.105***   0.107***   0.136***   0.133***   0.078***   0.120***   
 (3.93) (4.00) (4.29) (4.23) (2.78) (4.18) 
German Legal Origin 0.058 0.059 0.060 0.062 0.040 0.058 
 (1.36) (1.28) (1.24) (1.31) (1.16) (1.31) 
Nordic Legal Origin 0.071 0.057 0.083 0.08* 0.028 0.061 
  (1.67) (1.24) (1.66) (1.70) (0.80) (1.39) 
MacroRisk -1.045***   -0.988***   -1.015***   -1.013***   -0.985***   -0.982***   
 (3.90) (3.69) (3.21) (3.25) (4.12) (3.81) 
Log(GDP per Capita) -0.086***   -0.079***   -0.071***   -0.068***   -0.068***   -0.073***   
 (5.70) (4.97) (3.86) (3.99) (5.23) (4.62) 
Model F-statistic 
 (p-value) 12.0 (0.0) 15.0 (0.0) 7.7 (0.0) 8.2 (0.0) 14.4 (0.0) 9.8 (0.0) 
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Table 5. Causality Regressions: merger-level analysis of changes in bankruptcy law 
Probit estimation of the probability of same-industry acquisition (the dependent variable equals 1, using 2-digit SIC code).  The creditor rights 
change dummy, ΔCRIGHTS, represents a dummy variable with value zero for the control sample (no change in creditor rights) and for the 
treatment sample (countries in which there was change in CRIGHTS) prior to an increase in creditor rights strength or after a decrease in the 
creditor rights strength if the change reduced the strength of CRIGHTS. This dummy variable equals one following an increase in the creditor 
rights strength, and preceding a decrease in the creditor rights strength.  Included are all merger and acquisitions where the acquired percentage 
shares is at least 20%, the transaction has a disclosed value, and the time changes in creditor rights are available in Djankov et al. (2007a). We 
exclude transactions where the acquirer is in the financial industry (SIC header 6) or regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 49).  The sample 
period is 1994-2004. The t-statistics are in parentheses. The standard errors are cluster-adjusted at the country level. Included (but not reported for 
brevity) are fixed effects for country, year and the acquirer’s industry (2-digit SIC code), following the difference-in-differences methodology of 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). *** , **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Part I. Mutivariate Analysis 
Variable Pr(SAME) 
ΔCRIGHTS c,t -0.19***  
 (3.16) 
Log (Transaction Value) 0.027* 
 (1.86) 
Fixed Effects Country, year, and industry 
Observations 29,548 
 
Part II: Details of changes 
Country 
Year of law 
change Detail of change 
Indonesia 1998 Change to SECURED = 0 
Israel 1996 Introduction of automatic stay, i.e. AUTOSTAY = 0 
Japan 2000 Change to SECURED = 0 
Russia 1998 and 2002 
1998: Change to MANAGES = 0. 
2002: Re-instating MANAGES = 1. 
Sweden 1996 Change to REORG = 0. 
Thailand 1999 Change to REORG = 0. 
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Table 6. Operating risk and creditor rights: RISK at firm level 
The dependent variable, industry-adjusted RISK, is the standard deviation of the firm’s annual ROA defined as EBITDA/ASSETS (see definition in 
Table 1) minus that year’s median industry ROA (2-digit SIC code).  The sample period is 1992-2005. Included are companies from the 
manufacturing industry only (SIC 2000 – 3999).  We present the second stage estimation from the 2SLS system where we treat firm leverage as 
endogenous. We instrument leverage with the quartile ranks of the U.S. industry median leverage and tangibility. The t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on robust standard errors cluster-adjusted at the country level.  The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variable All countries Exclude U.S. 
Exclude U.S. 
and U.K. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CRIGHTS -0.006***      -0.006***  -0.006***  
 (2.75)     (2.67) (2.69) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.011      
  (1.52)      
REORG   -0.005     
   (0.84)     
SECURED    -0.006    
    (1.15)    
MANAGES     -0.022***    
     (3.74)   
SHRIGHTS -0.005 -0.005* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005* 
 (1.61) (1.80) (1.16) (1.29) (1.22) (1.62) (1.89) 
Log (Market cap) 0.006***  0.007***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.003 0.003 
 (3.10) (3.04) (2.64) (2.76) (3.59) (1.21) (0.74) 
Flexibility to fire 0.066***  0.075***  0.081***  0.077***  0.041* 0.06***  0.055***  
 (3.22) (3.73) (3.69) (3.75) (1.93) (3.03) (2.69) 
Accounting disclosure -0.001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (1.17) (1.17) (0.96) (1.08) (0.64) (0.66) (0.74) 
Emerging Market 0.011 0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.014* 0.012 0.009 
 (1.30) (0.71) (0.10) (0.15) (1.83) (1.52) (1.00) 
Rule of Law 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.012 0.013 
 (0.98) (0.91) (0.47) (0.43) (0.13) (1.35) (1.26) 
French Legal Origin -0.036***  -0.034***  -0.032***  -0.033***  -0.03***  -0.037***  -0.037***  
 (4.00) (3.73) (3.49) (3.67) (2.88) (4.45) (4.38) 
German Legal Origin -0.024***  -0.029***  -0.029***  -0.029***  -0.010 -0.025***  -0.022** 
 (3.41) (3.95) (4.08) (4.31) (1.14) (2.67) (2.14) 
Nordic Legal Origin -0.016 -0.021* -0.02* -0.02* -0.012 -0.021** -0.021* 
 (1.45) (1.84) (1.70) (1.73) (0.98) (2.04) (1.91) 
MacroRisk 0.101 0.086 0.096 0.081 0.116 0.100* 0.109* 
 (1.67) (1.30) (1.45) (1.27) (1.56) (1.73) (1.74) 
Log GDP per capita 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.0004 
 (0.68) (0.61) (1.26) (1.26) (0.87) (0.53) (0.09) 
Leverage (Instrumented) -0.145***  -0.151***  -0.153***  -0.157***  -0.150***  -0.125***  -0.149***  
 (4.17) (4.01) (3.85) (3.64) (4.15) (3.28) (3.06) 
Log(Initial total assets) -0.010** -0.01** -0.01** -0.010** -0.01** -0.006***  -0.004** 
 (2.55) (2.46) (2.45) (2.39) (2.45) (3.32) (2.53) 
Observations 5,394 5,394 5,394 5,394 5,394 3,812 3,385 
Model F-statistic (p-value) 52.8 (0.0) 42.1 (0.0) 44.9 (0.0) 58.6 (0.0) 178.4 (0.0) 36.8 (0.0) 40.6 (0.0) 
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 34 33 
 46
 
Table 7. Country-level operating risk, RISK*, and creditor rights 
RISK* is the median for each country of the variable RISK of the firms in the country, where RISK is the standard deviation of the industry-
adjusted firm profitability (as in Table 6). Included are companies from the manufacturing industry only (SIC 2000 – 3999). All variables are 
defined in Table 1. Sample period for the calculation of RISK* is 1992-2005. The number of observations is 35 (countries). The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CRIGHTS -0.007***     
 (3.35)     
AUTOSTAY  -0.015**    
  (2.12)    
REORG   -0.001   
   (0.15)   
SECURED    -0.010  
    (1.49)  
MANAGES     -0.023*** 
     (3.50) 
SHRIGHTS -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (1.32) (1.52) (0.46) (0.46) (1.14) 
Log (Market cap) 0.0003 0.001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.04) (0.02) 
Flexibility to fire -0.035 -0.023 -0.016 -0.022 -0.026 
 (1.19) (0.9) (0.52) (0.75) (1.14) 
Accounting disclosure -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.54) (0.62) (0.10) (0.20) (0.03) 
Emerging Market 0.012* 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.014* 
 (1.72) (1.15) (0.24) (0.25) (1.89) 
Rule of Law -0.002 0.0001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.010 
 (0.33) (0.01) (0.88) (0.74) (1.49) 
French Legal Origin -0.021** -0.019** -0.012 -0.012 -0.026*** 
 (2.21) (1.98) (1.08) (1.11) (2.78) 
German Legal Origin -0.018** -0.019** -0.017* -0.016* -0.019*** 
 (2.47) (2.18) (1.95) (1.86) (2.76) 
Nordic Legal Origin -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.28) (0.47) (0.34) (0.17) (0.88) 
MacroRisk -0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.023 0.009 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.12) (0.28) (0.12) 
Log GDP per capita -0.002 -0.002 0.0004 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.54) (0.43) (0.06) (0.12) (0.33) 
R-squared 52.1% 45.9% 33.9% 39.8% 57.3% 
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Table 8. Recovery rates and mergers and acquisitions  
The table presents coefficient estimates of probit models. The dependent variable equals 1 if Prob(TH∩AL|TH) = 1, i.e., if the target is in a high-
recovery industry and the acquirer is in a low-recovery industry. The universe is all target firms in high recovery industry. Included are all 
transactions where the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. Excluded are transactions involving acquirers that are financial industry (SIC 
header 6) or regulated industry companies (SIC headers 48 and 49). The following industries are classified as low recovery (2-SIC code headers): 
transportation (37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47), high technology and office equipment (35, 36, 38), consumer/ service sector (52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 
58, 59, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79), or leisure time/ media (27, 48, 70). The following industries are classified as high recovery (2-SIC code headers): 
energy and natural resources (10, 12, 13, 14, 24), building products/ homebuilders (8, 15, 17, 24, 28, 29, 32, 34), or healthcare/ chemicals (28, 
80). This classification follows Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007).  All variables are defined in Table 1. The leverage of acquirer and target 
are calculated as in Table 3. The sample period is 1994-2004. The absolute values of the t-statistics are shown in parentheses below the 
coefficients and are based on robust standard errors that are cluster-adjusted at the country level. We include a year fixed effect (not reported). ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, correspondingly. 
All countries Excluding the U.S. & U.K. Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CRIGHTS 
 
0.128** 
(2.45)     
0.354*** 
(4.56)     
AUTOSTAY 
  
0.915*** 
(6.30)     
0.425** 
(2.38)    
REORG 
   
0.277* 
(1.93)     
0.492*** 
(2.64)   
SECURED 
    
0.124 
(0.60)     
0.51** 
(2.33)  
MANAGES 
     
0.619*** 
(3.50)     
1.466*** 
(5.25) 
SHRIGHTS 
 
-0.107* 
(1.65) 
0.016 
(0.22) 
-0.114* 
(1.71) 
-0.118 
(1.54) 
-0.22*** 
(2.71) 
-0.18*** 
(3.32) 
-0.191*** 
(2.81) 
-0.165** 
(2.33) 
-0.211*** 
(3.35) 
-0.357*** 
(5.81) 
Log (Market 
cap) 
0.083 
(1.17) 
-0.615*** 
(6.49) 
0.12* 
(1.86) 
0.165** 
(2.27) 
0.116* 
(1.90) 
0.283*** 
(2.94) 
0.25** 
(2.13) 
0.205** 
(2.05) 
0.081 
(0.66) 
0.416*** 
(3.47) 
Flexibility to 
fire 
-1.250 
(1.34) 
-2.379** 
(2.32) 
-1.716 
(1.52) 
-1.305 
(0.99) 
-0.274 
(0.33) 
-0.497 
(0.67) 
-1.108 
(1.12) 
-1.496 
(1.67) 
-1.456 
(1.21) 
1.86** 
(2.16) 
Accounting 
disclosure 
-0.05*** 
(3.73) 
0.018 
(1.15) 
-0.045*** 
(3.38) 
-0.034*** 
(3.05) 
-0.056*** 
(4.51) 
-0.035*** 
(3.23) 
-0.039*** 
(3.12) 
-0.039*** 
(3.6) 
-0.036*** 
(3.45) 
-0.048*** 
(5.23) 
Emerging 
Markets 
-0.162 
(1.02) 
-1.138*** 
(5.69) 
-0.059 
(0.49) 
0.027 
(0.21) 
-0.259 
(1.68) 
-0.453 
(1.47) 
-0.492 
(1.44) 
-0.345 
(0.99) 
-0.84** 
(2.31) 
-0.157 
(0.49) 
Rule of Law 
 
0.190 
(1.01) 
-0.56** 
(2.33) 
0.225 
(1.18) 
0.161 
(0.76) 
0.424** 
(2.05) 
0.186 
(0.81) 
-0.209 
(0.8) 
0.107 
(0.44) 
-0.145 
(0.55) 
0.909*** 
(3.15) 
French Legal 
Origin 
-0.405 
(1.44) 
0.317 
(1.04) 
-0.418 
(1.52) 
-0.538 
(1.59) 
-0.72*** 
(2.69) 
-0.330 
(1.09) 
-0.849** 
(2.49) 
-0.579 
(1.63) 
-0.707** 
(2.14) 
-0.774** 
(2.57) 
German Legal 
Origin 
-0.257** 
(2.08) 
1.483*** 
(9.38) 
-0.099 
(0.94) 
-0.084 
(0.62) 
-0.871*** 
(3.57) 
-1.118*** 
(3.65) 
-1.017*** 
(2.70) 
-0.578 
(1.32) 
-0.868* 
(1.90) 
-2.025*** 
(6.15) 
Nordic Legal 
Origin  
0.733** 
(2.00) 
-2.317*** 
(4.46) 
0.817** 
(2.26) 
0.982** 
(2.08) 
0.670* 
(1.79) 
0.156 
(0.35) 
0.289 
(0.58) 
0.112 
(0.25) 
-0.218 
(0.48) 
0.279 
(0.57) 
MacroRisk 
 
5.734* 
(1.94) 
9.374*** 
(3.01) 
6.488** 
(2.42) 
9.048*** 
(3.92) 
4.761 
(1.68) 
3.149 
(1.15) 
5.129* 
(1.7) 
5.223** 
(1.99) 
5.228* 
(1.79) 
4.462 
(1.6) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.249* 
(1.75) 
0.600*** 
(3.47) 
0.173 
(1.29) 
0.156 
(0.99) 
0.272** 
(1.98) 
0.3** 
(2.32) 
0.363** 
(2.09) 
0.211 
(1.57) 
0.222 
(1.25) 
0.249** 
(2.05) 
Log 
(Transaction 
Value) 
0.015 
(1.49) 
-0.136*** 
(6.45) 
0.017* 
(1.70) 
0.019* 
(1.95) 
0.017* 
(1.7) 
0.073*** 
(3.11) 
0.076*** 
(3.23) 
0.077*** 
(3.22) 
0.074*** 
(3.14) 
0.085*** 
(3.65) 
Acquirer’s 
Leverage 
(imputed) 
-12.99*** 
(9.47) 
-26.83*** 
(7.03) 
-12.88*** 
(9.25) 
-12.71*** 
(9.08) 
-12.96*** 
(9.4) 
-15.25*** 
(12.8) 
-14.80*** 
(12.65) 
-14.84*** 
(12.04) 
-14.72*** 
(11.71) 
-15.17*** 
(12.37) 
Target’s 
Leverage 
(imputed) 
5.838*** 
(9.03) 
32.688*** 
(14.58) 
5.658*** 
(8.66) 
5.342*** 
(7.66) 
5.762*** 
(8.83) 
10.807*** 
(7.75) 
10.217*** 
(7.22) 
10.046*** 
(6.62) 
9.833*** 
(6.93) 
10.133*** 
(7.45) 
# of countries 38 38 38 38 38 36 36 36 36 36 
Observations 6,495 6,495 6,495 6,495 6,495 3,356 3,356 3,356 3,356 3,356 
Chi-squared 28,376.0 6,360.2 43,325.1 13,403.8 12,529.0 27,974.7 6,449.9 15,708.8 9,494.0 13,115.9 
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Figure 1. Timeline of the model. 
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Figure 2. The share of same-industry mergers in a country, SAME, and creditor rights, CRIGHTS. 
The fitted line represents the slope from a Tobit regression of the fraction of same industry mergers in a country on a constant and 
the creditor rights index. 
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